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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
a Utah corporation.
Plaintiff-Respondent.
vs.
SPENCER C. TAYLOR, Bank Commissioner
of the State of Utah, and State Bank
of Provo, a Utah corporation,
Defendants-Appellants.

NO.
9947

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF FIRST NATIONAL
BANK OF LOGAN, UTAH
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
It is not the intent of the First National Bank to
submit an extended brief. We fully agree with the
position taken by appellant. We only desire to supplement the contentions of appellant by making a few observations which may amplify the position taken by them.

ARGUMENT
I

THERE IS A MARKED DISTINCTION BETWEEN
A UNIT BANK AND A BRANCH BANK.
Walker Bank & Trust Company contends the institution known as the Farmers & Merchants Branch of Walker
1
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Bank & Trust Company is a bank and not a branch; it,
therefore, becomes important to distinguish ~etween a
bank and a branch.
U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 7.-3-8 provides,
The term "commercial bank'' when used in this
chapter means any bank organized for the purpose
of receiving deposits of money subject to withdrawal
upon check or other demand, and engaging in other
banking activities.
And this is the definition given of a branch:
The term ''branch" as used in this section shall be
held to include any branch bank, branch office,
branch agency, additional office, or any branch place
of business at which deposits are received, or checks
paid, or money lent. U.C.A. Sec. 53-7-3-6.
II
THE FARMERS' & MERCHANTS' BRANCH OF
THE WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY OF
PROVO, UTAH, IS A BRANCH BANK AND NOT A
UNIT BANK.
An attempt to show that the Farmers' & Merchants'
Branch of the Walker Bank & Trust Company is a bank
by showing its functions does not get to the heart of the
matter. The distinguishing characteristics between a
bank and a branch is not found in the difference between
the type of business which they conduct, but rather in
their management and control.
To determine that control let us look to the merger
agreement dated the 28th day of September, 1956, be2
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tween the Walker Bank & Trust Company, a Utah Corporation, and the Farmers' & Merchants' Bank of Provo, a
Utah Corporation, now in file in the office of the Secretary
of State of Utah.
The second paragraph on page 2 of the Agreement
provides:
WHEREAS, the respective Boards of Directors
of Walker Bank and Farmers' & Merchants' Bank of
Provo deem it advisable for the purpose of greater
efficiency and economy of management and in order
to expand the territory which can be served, as well
as the general welfare of said corporations, and their
stockholders, that the Farmers' & Merchants' Bank of
Provo be merged with and into Walker Bank under
and pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 6, Title 7,
Utah Code Annotated 1953 pursuant to the terms
and conditions hereinafter set forth;
The merger agreement further provides:
Paragraph 1. The Farmers' & Merchants' Bank
of Provo, shall be and it hereby is merged with and
into Walker Bank.
Paragraph 2. Walker Bank shall continue in
existence as the corporation surviving said merger,
and shall, as heretofore, be a corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the State of Utah.
Walker Bank, as it shall exist from and after the date
of said merger (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
"the merger") becomes effective, is hereunder sometimes called "the Surviving Corporation" or "the
Resulting Bank.,.
Paragraph 4. The name of the Surviving Corporation is and shall be Walker Bank & Trust
Company.
3
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Paragraph 5 of the merger provides for capital stock
of Walker Bank & Trust Company. There is nothing said
about the capital stock of the Farmers' & Merchants'
Branch of Provo, except that it shall be converted into
shares of stock of the Walker Bank & Trust Company.
Paragraph 7 of the agreement among other things
provides that the Walker Bank & Trust Company's main
office is to be located 175 South Main Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah, and the Farmer's & Merchants' Branch is to
be located 9th North and 3rd West in Provo, Utah. (Here
we may explain that the Farmers' & Merchants' Branch
of the Walker Bank & Trust Company carries on a general
banking business in Provo, Utah, but only as a branch
banls)
Paragraph 9 provides among other matters that the
officers of the head office are the following: John M.
Wallace, President; Reed E. Holt, Executive Vice President; 0. K. Carlson, Senior Vice President; and that the
officers of the Farmers' & Merchants' Branch are a vicepresident and manager and other minor officers. It also
provides for officers of the Walker Bank & Trust Company
consisting of a Board -of Directors as provided by law.
No provision is made for a Board of Directors of the
Farmers' & Merchants' Branch.
Section 7-6-6 of the U.C.A. 1953 provides that upon
a merger (such as the one which we are now dealing)
the charter of the constituent bank (Farmers' & Merchants'
Bank) other than the resultant bank (Walker Bank &
Trust Company) shall thereupon be deemed to have been
surrendered.
4
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Paragraph 10 specifically provides that the separate
corporate existence of the Farmers' & Merchants' Bank
shall cease and become effective on the date of the
merger, and all of its property transferred and vested in
the Walker Bank & Tn1st Company.
Without a charter, without any capital stock, without
a board of directors, without any property whatsoever
can it be said that the Farmers' & Merchants' Bank longer
exists as a corporate entity. By taking away its charter,
its capital structure, its board of directors and all of its
property, its separate corporate existence would expire
without the provisions of Paragraph 10 of the merger. 13
Am Jur ~.f:>,.-t II

q"

But contends plaintiff the Farmers' & Merchants
Branch of the Walker Bank & Trust Company occupies
the same banking house as was formerly occupied by the
Farmers & Merchants Bank and continues to do a banking business in Provo, Utah.
We are cognizant of the fact that Section 7-6-7 U.C.A.
1953 provides as follows:
The resulting state bank shall be considered the
same business and corporate entity as each constituent bank with all the rights, powers and duties of
each constitutent bank except as limited by the
Charter and by-laws of the resulting state bank.
_).J.cl}

Section 16-10-71, the section in effect at the time of
said merger, supplements the above statute, as follows:
Upon the consummation of such consolidation
all the rights, privileges and franchises of each of the
5
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consolidating corporations, and all the property, real
and personal, and all subscriptions and debts due on
whatever account shall be deemed to be transferred
to and vested in s~ch new corporation without further
act or deed.
But we cannot agree that one of the rights and powers
transferred to the resultant bank was the right of the
resultant bank to protect the former status of he Farmers'
& Merchan1f Bank and its competitive situation as provided under section 7-6-7 U. C .A. '53. Subdivision (B)
and (C) of Section 7-67 U.C.A. 1953 illustrates the type
or rights and powers passing from the constituent bank
to the resultant bank and this is supplemented by the
following quotation from Fletcher on Corporations.
Under a provision giving a consolidated corporation the rights, franchises, privileges and property
of the consolidating corporations, or without such
a provision, and in the absence of provision to the
contrary, it has been held that a consolidated corporation acquired the power of eminet domain enjoyed by one or both of the consolidating corporations,
the right, in the case of a railrod company, to charge
a certain rate for transportation of persons or property, the power, through a quasi public corporation,
like a railroad company, to mortgage its property
and franchises, an immunity of officers and employees
from working on the public roads or serving on the
jury, the right to compromise and settle a claim
against one of the consolidating corporations, and to
maintain an action to enforce a settlement, the right
to the benefit of a license to use a patent enjoyed by
the co~solidating corporations, and the right (in case
of a railroad company, for example) to receive subscriptions by cities and other municipality. A
6
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consolidated company may claim a mechanic's lien
for materials furnished by a cons!tuent corporation.
Franchise rights of the constituent companies
vest in the consolidated company. Thus where, by
statute, the consolidated company is vested with all
the assets of the constituent companies, rights in the
streets under municipal ordinances pass to the new
corporation. But the life of a prior franchise is not,
of course, extended by a consolidation of constituent
railway companies into one company. (Fletcher's
Corporations, vol. 7, Section 4715, p. 8352-3).
Paragraphs B and C of Section 7-6-7 U.C.A. 1953
provides:
The resulting state bank shall have the right
to use the name of any consituent bank whenever it
can do any act under such name more conveniently.
Any reference to any constituent bank in any
writing, whether executed or taking effect before or
after the merger, shall be deemed a reference to the
resulting state bank if not inconsistent with the other
provisions of such writing.

From its inception the entire merger agreement proclaims that the status of the Farmers' & Merchants' Bank
was changed; in losing its corporate franchise; transferring
its stock and its p1·operty, in becoming a branch office
and changing its name, it lost its former status as a unit
bank, it no longer had the right to protect its status as
such.

III
THE WORDS BANK OR BANKS AS USED IN
SECTION 7-3-6 U.C.A. DOES NOT INCLUDE
BRANCH BANKS.
7
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Supplementing the contention of appellants so ably
set forth in their brief now on file in this court we suggest the following:
In 1927 when the branch banking law was before
the Congress of the United States, Senator Vandenburg
made the following comment:
"Except in a city, town, or village where there
is no National or State bank regularly transacting
customary banking business, no such association shall
establish a branch except by taking over a unit bank
existing at the time of the enactment hereof or an
affiliate of such association." 76 Cong. Rec. 2026.
It is clear that when Senator Vandenburg used the
word bank (no national or state bank) he meant unit
bank and not branches for he goes on to say "no such
association (meaning unit banks) shall establish a branch."
Mter the national banking law a number of states
passed acts regulating branches. Our own state permitted
branch banking with this prohibitation; Except in cities
of first class a bank cannot branch in Cities or towns
where there is already a bank or banks. It is our contention that the words bank or banks did not include
branches. That if our law-makers had intended the
words bank or banks to include branches they would
have so provided, by adding to the words used. this
further statement: or branches thereof.
It may be helpful to determine the intent of our own
lawmakers to determine how other states have defined
the prohibited area:
8
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The State of Connecticut in its act provided:
"With the approval of the commissioner any state
bank may establish and operate one or more branches
in any town or towns within this state in which the
main office of no state bank and trust company or
national banking association is located." General
Statutes of Conn. as amended by Public Acts of
1959, no. 275.
The laws of the state of Indiana provides:
"Any bank or trust company may open or establish
a branch bank in any city or town within the limits
of the county in which the principal office of such
bank or trust company is located, if there be no bank
or trust company located in such city or town." Acts
of 1959, Chapter 59.
The laws of the state of Iowa provide:
"A bank may not establish an office beyond those
counties contiglitous to the country in which a bank
is located nor in a city or town in which a bank is
already established." Iowa Code Annotated Paragraph 528.51.
Rev. Stat. Oregon Para. 714. 50 provides:
~~A branch may not be established in any city or
town, village or community in which a national bank
or state bank is doing business except by taking over
an existing or national or state bank."

These statutes are similar to our own and the word
bank or banks is used in these statutes with the same
meaning that the word bank or banks is used in the statutes of the State of Utah.
9
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Another type of statutes of other states were enacted
to prevent a branch from being established where another
bank or branches were in existence. I quote from the
statutes of these states.
MAINE
"However, a trust company may establish a branch
in any city, town or village where there are no state
banks, or where a unit bank or branch of another
bank is taken over." Rev. St. Ch. 59 Art. 11, Para. 65.
MASSACHUSETTS
"However, no branch or depot may be opened in any
other town if the main office or a branch office of
any savings bank is therein located." Mass. Anno.
Laws, Ch. 493.
NEW JERSEY
"However, a bank may establish a branch office in
any municipality where no bank has its principal
office or branch office.~~ N. J. St. Anno. 17:9A-238
to 17:9A1239.
MICHIGAN
"No facilities may be established if a bank or a
branch thereof is then in operation.', Michigan Public
Acts 1959, No. 248.
In these states the Legislatures desired that the prohibited area was where bank or branches were located.
.In each of these states the legislature added the word
branch to the word banks.
As ·we search for the meaning of the word banks as
used in our statute it may be well to keep in mind the

10
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stahttes of other states. These states describing the prohibited area where branches may not be established use
the word banks to describe that area and when they want
to enlarge the prohibited area they add the word branches.
Our legislature by not adding branches to the prohibited
area must have intended that the prohibited area included
only unit banks.
IV
SECTION 7-3-6 U.C.A. DOES NOT PROHIBIT A
HOME OFFICE BANK IN A CITY OF SECOND CLASS
FROM BRANCHING.
Having established that the word bank or banks as
used in section 7-3-6 U.C.A. means unit bank and not
branches, our next inquiry is; Does the presence of th~
Provo State Bank in the prohibited area bar said unit
bank from establishing a branch there.
sai~

Let us consider the last sentence in paragraph IV of"
section 7-3-6 Said paragraph provides:
"Except in cities. of the first class, or within
unincorporated areas of a county in which a city of
the first class is located, no branch -bank shall be
established in any city or town in which is located a
bank or banks, state or national, regularly transacting
a customary banking business, unless the bank seeking to establish such branchshalltake over an existing bank. No unit bank>[!fJ!/:.:_-lized 1and opera[#ng at
a point where there areJ(t)peratin--grfftbe.J:')banks, state
or_ national," shall be permitted to~acquired by
another bank for the purpose of establishing a branch
until such bank shall have been in operation as such
for a period of five years.', (italics ours)
.11
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If a unit bank may not be acquired by another bank
until it is in operation for five years, the converse would
be true and using this meaning the sentence would read:
A unit bank doing business where there are other
operating banks may not acquire another bank for the
purpose of establishing a branch until such bank shall
have been in operation for a period of five years.
Reading the entire paragraph enlightened by this
sentence (changed in construction but not in meaning)
suggests that a unit bank may not establish a branch where
there are other operating unit banks. Such interpretation
gives the State Bank of Provo the right to establish a
bank at the Brigham Young University, for at the time it
received permission to establish such a branch bank, there
were no other unit banks operating in the city of Provo.
While this contention is not conclusive, it points to
the fact that there may be two interpretations of the
fourth paragraph of Section 7-3-6 U .C.A. 53.
It is quite clear that the only prohibition contained
in Section 7-3-6 does not apply in this case. It is equally
clear from the history of the regulation of branch banking
in Utah that the statute does not prohibit home office
banks from establishing branches in their charter cities
even though such city is not of the first class.

The banking crisis in 1933 prompted an amendment
( L. 1933, Ch. 6, Sec. 1) to the Utah Code authorizing
branch banking in Utah for the first time since it was
expressly prohibited in 1911 (L. 1911, Ch. 25, Sec. 32).

12
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The amendement permitted branches in citiesbf the first
class without restriction while in other cities or towns
branches could be established ( 1) by taking over an
<'xisting bank, or ( 2) by obtaining the consent of all
existing banks in the community. In 1949, in Union Trust
Co. v. Simmons 116 Utah 422, 211 P.2d 190, the Utah
Supreme Court declared the consent provision unconstitutional on the ground that it was an improper delegation
of a legislative function to private parties. Thus, in 1951
the legislature amended Section 7-3-6 by deleting the
unconstitutional consent provision. This deletion did not
take away the authority to branch; it simply removed a
procedural condition precedent.
Under the law prior to the decision in Union Trust
Company v. Simmons (ante) and under similar conditions
where there were only one bank and two branch banks
in Provo had the Provo bank made application for branch
in the city of Provo all it would need was its own consent.
That would be indicated in its appliaction. It could
then branch in the city of Provo. By a mere procedural
change in the law, can it be said that the purpose of the
law was changed and the Prove home bank could no
longer establish a branch in Provo? The whole history
of branch banking legislation so ably presented in appellants brief shows that this could not have been the intent
of the legislature. It is only by singling out one particular sentence in the entire law and giving a strained construction even to that sentence can we say that the Provo
Bank is proscribed and limited in its branching.
It is apparent that the consent provision was a device
whereby existing home office banks could determine who

13
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would be allowed to compete with them. It allowed
home office banks to prevent the branch systems or bigger
banks from entering the home office city except by taking
over another bank. This scheme allowed for increases in
banking facilities to meet the needs of the community by
allowing out-of-town banks to merge existing in-town
banks. At the same time it provided protection for the
communitis home office banks by preventing out-of-town
banks from entering the city indis·criminately thereby increasing the number of competitor banks. It follows that
the legislature meant to correct the unconstitutional condition in such a way as to retain home office protection
without taking away the authority of the protected banks
to expand their fa:cilities to satisfy the needs of the community.
Paragraph IV of Section 7-3-6 is a prohibition. It
prohibits branch banking in certain cities and towns. One
may conclude by reading this sentence separate and apart
from any other that branching is prohibited in certain
cities and towns in this state where there are other banks.
But was that the intent of our Legislature? Did our law
makers intend that the Provo State Bank could not branch
in the city of Provo because in a strict construction of the
statute it was already there? Did its presence in the
forbidden area preclude it from branching there?
It is the duty of the Court to determine what was in
the minds of our law makers when it prescribed forbidden
areas in cities not of the first class.

We quote from Uphoff v. Industrial Board. 271 Ill.
312, 111 N.E. 128, Ann. Cas. 1917 D·, page 1.

14
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''The intention of the law-makers is the law.
This intention is to be gathered from the necessity
or reason of the enactment and the meaning of the
words enlarged or restricted according to their rea]
intent. In construing a statute the courts are not
confined to the literal meaning of the words. A
thing within the intention is regarded within the
statute though not within the letter. A thing within
the letter is not within the statute if not also within
the intention. When the intention can be collected
from the statute, words may be modified or altered
so as to obviate all inconsistency with such intention."
Why the enactment of the prohibition found in the
first sentence of Paragraph IV? Did the Legislature intend that the Provo State Bank should be protected from
the competition of its own branch?
A contrary interpretation woul mean th~t existing
public needs in a city outside Salt Lake City could not
be fulfilled since no additional branch facilities could be
provided by an existing home office bank. The entire
statutory scheme of allowing additional branches when
the public convenience and advantage would be served
thereby would be subverted, not promoted. Thus, it is
exceptionally clear that the statute does not prohibit a
home office bank from branching within its charter city,
especially when there is no other home office bank located
within that city. Such is the situation in Provo, Utah.

v
SECTION 7-3-6 U.C.A. SHOULD BE INTERPRETED TO AVOID UNJUST, UNFAIR, ABSURD OR
INEQUITABLE RESULTS.

15
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"By this we do not mean that where the ordinary
meaning of the language employed would lead to an
absurdity, or inflict great injustice, the ordinary meaning of the words should not be restricted or expanded,
if necessary, to avoid an absurdity or an injustice;
but this is only another way of stating that courts
cannot assume that the lawmaker really intended to
enact either absurd or unjust laws." Plaster & Mfg.
Co. v. Juab County. 33 Utah 114, 93 Pac. 53.
~'In the construction of a statute consideration
of what causes injustice may have a potent influence,
it is not to be supposed that the framers of the statute contemplated a violation of the rules of natural
justice and it should not be presumed to have been
within the legislative intent to enact a law having an
unjust result." 50 Am Jur (Statutes) Para. 370.
~'The law is presumed to be equitable and it is a
reasonable and safe rule of construction to remove
any ambiguities in the statute in favor of an equitable operation of the law." 50 Am Jur (Statutes)
Para. 369.

The Court should not adopt the interpretation of
section 7-3-6 U.C.A. requested by respondent. This would
mean that the State Bank of Provo was the only bank
in t.fl.e state of Utah that could not branch in Provo. Zions
First National Bank of Salt Lake City or any other bank
in the state could with the consent of the State Bank Commissioner or the Comptroller of Currency by a merger
with the Provo State Bank establish a branch in that city.
But the appellant cannot merge with itself. It is therefore denied a privilege given to every other bank in this
state.
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VI
SECTION 7-3-6 U.C.A. 1953 SHOULD NOT BE
CONSTRUED TO BE INIMICAL TO PUBLIC WELFARE.
Banks are unlike other private corporations; they are
affected with a public interest. As is stated in Schaake
et al v. Dolley et al118 Pac. 80, Ann. Cas. 1913 A. 254.
"Banking has ceased to~ if it ever was, a matter of
private concern only, like the business of the merchant, and for all purposes of legislative regulation
and control it may be said to be "affected with a
public interest.' The public patronage which the
banker invites and receives is of such a character
that he becomes in a just sense a trustee of the fiscal
affairs of the people and of the state. If a merchant
cannot meet his bills promptly the general public
is not disturbed. He is not ruined at once, and if he
should fail, the effects are limited, to comparatively
a few persons. If a bank is unable to meet a check
drawn on it, the refusal to pay is an act of insolvency.
Its doors are closed, its business is arrested, its
affairs go into liquidation, and the mischief takes a
wide range. Those who have been accommodated
with loans must pay, whatever their readiness or
ability to do so. Further advances cannot be obtained. Other banks must call in their loans and
refuse to extend credit in order to fortify themselves
against the uneasiness and even terror of their own
depositors. Confidence is destroyed. Enterprises
are stopped. Business is brought to a standstill.
Securities are enforced. Property is sacrificed, and
disaster spreads from locality to locality. All these
incidents of the banking business are matters of common knowledge and experience. They clearly dis-
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tiguish banking from the ordinary IJ'rivate business,
illustrate its public nature, and show that it is properly subject to the police power of the state, vested
in its legislature."
Because of this public character banks are obligated
to serve the public and make it as convenient as possible
for the pubHc to do their banking business. In order to
best serve the public in these days of dependence on
automobiles for transporation, banks must branch and
bring their places of business to an area where the public
congregate for other business purposes. Our lawmakers
must be presumed to have the interest of their constituents in mind when they provided for branch banking.
After providing for their safety by requiring approval of
the bank commissioner or comptrolled of currency they
must not have intended that these safe institutions be
restricted in their branching. They could not have intended that a bank in a fast growing community where
their were no other banking facilities could not branch
and thereby offer their services to the public at a place
where people assemble for other business purposes.
In the interpretation of the statute it is not to be
presumed that the legislature intended to endanger or to
sacrifice great public interest. Indeed, a purpose to disregard sound public policy must not be attributed to the
law-making power. Where a statute is ambiguous, Courts
interpreting the same may give consideration to the necessities of public welfare, policy, or interest, and where
one construction of a statute will lead to possible mischief
which another construction will avoid, the latter is favored.
50 Am Jur (Statutes) para. 381.
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An interpretation of the statute which permits two
large chain banks to come into Provo and purchase unit
banks, convert them into branches with the attendant disadvantages of large chain banks and refuses to permit a
home bank to serve its patrons by making their banking
business more convenient is against public interest and
should not be adopted.
Such an interpretation would mean that existing
public needs in cities found outside of Salt Lake City
could not be fulfilled since no branch facilities could be
provided by the existing home office bank. The entire
statutory scheme of allowing additional branches when
the public convenience, and advantage would be served.
would thereby be subverted, and not promoted.
CONCLUSION
As indicated by their brief submitted in the trial court
this is respondent's theory of the case.
First; They contend that Farmers' and Merchants'
Bank retained its status as a bank after its merger with
Walker Bank.
Reducing this argument to its simplest terms we get
this result;
A. Branch banks can only be established in an
area in cities other than the first class by an existing bank
taking over another bank.
B. In the meaning of section 7-3-6 U.C.A. when one
bank is taken over by another bank, the bank taken over
continues as a bank.
19
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I.

From these premises this conclusion is -.nevitable.
There can be no branch banking in cities, other than the
first class, in the state of Utah. Such a conclusion seems
absurd.
Second; They contend that even though the status of
Farmers' & Merchants' Bank is changed by the merger
into a branch, the appellant cannot branch because it
already occupies the prohibited area as a bani<.
On the other hand the theory of the appellants can
be summed up as follows:
A. By section 7-3-6 U.C.A. the legislature intended
that there could be other ways, besides a take over, to
establish a branch in cities other than of first class.
B. When a bank is taken over by another bank it
does not continue as a bank but is transformed into a
branch.
C. Conclusion; A unit bank may establish a branch
in its home city because there are no other banks there only branches. This conclusion of appellants gives meaning to the intent of the legislature.
Respectfully submitted,

L. TOM PERRY,
Attorney for First National
Bank of Logan
Logan, Utah
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SPECIAL APPEAL
Finally I desire to call to the attention of the Court,
the vital interest of the First National Bank of Logan in
this action. As suggested in its application to file a brief
amicus·curiae in this matter, Logan City has one unit bank,
The First National Bank of Logan, and two branch banks,
the Cache Valley Branch of the Walker Bank & Trust
Company and the Logan Branch of the First Security
Bank. Its situation is analogous to appellants in Provo,
Utah.
On the 21st day of January, 1963, the Comptroller of
Currency granted a certificate of authority to the First
National Bank of Logan to establish a branch bank in
Logan, Utah where it had a unit bank; that on the 11th
day of July, 1963, Walker Bank & Trust Company filed
an action in the District Court of the United States for
the District of Utah seeking to have the certificate of
authority of the Comptroller of Currency cancelled and
have the First National Bank of Logan, Utah enjoined
from operating its branch bank. This action is now pend·
in g.
The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in this action
will greatly influence the United States District Court in
its decision, as the branch banking law of the State is used
as a measuring stick by the United States Comptroller of
Currency to determine the authority for a National Bank to
branch. The First National Bank of Logan has therefore
a vital interest in this matter.

L. TOM PERRY,
Attorney for First National
Bank of Logan
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